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NOTE
DID CONGRESS INTEND TO GIVE PATIENTS
THE RIGHT TO DEMAND AND RECEIVE
INAPPROPRIATE MEDICAL TREATMENTS?:
EMTALA REEXAMINED IN LIGHT OF BABY K
ELIzABETH A. LARSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress amended the Social Security Act to prohibit
hospitals that receive Medicare funds from engaging in the practice of
patient "dumping."' Patient dumping is the refusal by a hospital to
provide necessary emergency medical treatment to someone based upon
that person's inability to pay.2 Because this amendment was part of the
Congressional Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, it was commonly
referred to by the acronym COBRA for some time3 but is now known as
EMTALA, short for "Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act."
While legislative history shows that EMTALA was meant to protect
the indigent and uninsured,4 Congress did not explicitly limit coverage
to those people in the language of the Act,5 leaving the courts to
determine whether EMTALA should apply to that class of people
exclusively or to everyone. Relying on the intent expressed in legislative
history, some courts have limited EMTALA's coverage to the indigent
* B.A. 1990, M.L.S. 1992, UCLA; Class of 1996, University of Wisconsin Law
School. Thanks to Andy Aligne for suggesting the topic, to Jeff Brown for critiquing the
final draft, and to Matthew Weber for much-needed recent encouragement.
1. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 164 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994)).
2. The patient is sometimes said to have "failed the wallet biopsy." DAVID U.
HIMMELSTEIN & STEFFIE WOOLHANDLER, THE NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM BOOK: A
SouRcE GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 52 (1994). For a discussion of America's dumping
dilemma, see infra part II.B.
3. See, e.g., Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening
the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186 (1986).
4. If a person's insurance does not cover the care he needs, he is effectively
uninsured for that care. Therefore, the underinsured are implicitly included in the
category of people who cannot pay for the medical care they need. For the sake of
simplicity, I will use the description "indigent and uninsured" throughout this Comment.
5. Read literally, the statute applies when "any individual" seeks emergency
medical treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
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and uninsured.6 However, the majority of courts that have decided this
issue have relied upon the plain meaning of EMTALA's text and ruled
that it applies to everyone.7 Pointing to this division among the courts,
other commentators have called upon Congress to amend EMTALA to
clarify this matter once and for all. 8 In June 1994, the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services promulgated interim final regulations to
implement EMTALA. Under the Department's regulations, EMTALA
is applicable when any individual comes to an emergency department,
"regardless of [his] ability to pay. " "
This Comment focuses on the courts' and the Department of Health
and Human Services' interpretations of EMTALA's stated coverage,
specifically the question of who can bring suit under the Act. This
Comment argues that the majority rule (i.e., the rule established by the
Department of Health and Human Services and the majority of federal
courts that have decided this issue) is unwise. Under the majority rule,
even the fully insured may bring suit under EMTALA. However, with
the element of economic discrimination absent from such a case, it is
difficult to determine exactly what role EMTALA should play. The
courts that have adopted this rule have established a variety of tests for
finding a violation in such cases. While these tests differ from one
another, they share a common goal: to determine whether a particular
hospital failed to adequately screen the patient for an emergency medical
condition and, if such a condition was found, whether the hospital
stabilized it before releasing or transferring the patient.
The goal of these tests is effectively indistinguishable from that of
state malpractice laws: to determine whether the established standard of
care was breached. But while the common law of malpractice takes
6. Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992); Coleman v.
McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Okla.
1991), overruled by Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992);
ZaiKaner v. Danaher, No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1990);
Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F.
Supp. 325, 329-30 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495,
497-98 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
7. See, e.g., Collins, 963 F.2d at 308; Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d
412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037,
1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 269-70
(6th Cir. 1990); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. 111.
1990).
8. See Timothy D. Krugh, The Federal Anti-Dumping Act After Five Years: A
Critical Analysis of Medical COBRA, 1991 LEOAL MED. 287, 316; Thomas L. Stricker,
Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act.- Denial of Emergency
Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121,
1149 (1992).
9. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a) (1994).
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individual factors into account, EMTALA is brief, vaguely written, and
provides no guidance for determining a standard of care. The courts have
recognized these ambiguities and, until the recent case of In re Baby K,10
have been hesitant to find a violation when the plaintiff was fully insured.
In deciding the case of Baby K, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit became the first court to find a (potential)
EMTALA violation in a case involving a fully insured patient. However,
by pointing out that EMTALA makes no exception for treatment outside
the prevailing standard of care or for treatment that is medically and
ethically inappropriate,11  the court helped to illustrate the
shortsightedness of the majority rule and the unsuitability of EMTALA
as a means of deciding cases that involve no allegation of economically
motivated dumping. This case highlights the need for clarification of
EMTALA's scope-more specifically, the need to limit its coverage to
cases of true dumping.
Part II of this Comment examines legislative history which shows
that EMTALA's true purpose was to prevent economically motivated
patient dumping. Part II also presents a brief history of America's patient
dumping crisis. This part concludes with an argument that, because
EMTALA's legislative history shows that its purpose was to end the
despicable practice of patient dumping, it should be used only in cases
with evidence of true dumping.
Part III details the division among the courts in interpreting
EMTALA's coverage and concludes that the majority rule duplicates
malpractice law in its goal but not in its methods, and that EMTALA's
methods are not sophisticated enough to play this role. This part also
examines the case of Baby K, the first case in which a hospital was found
to have (potentially) violated EMTALA in its dealings with a fully insured
patient. In this case, a federal court used EMTALA to override a
legitimate medical and ethical decision, despite the fact that the Act was
intended to override economic decisions only.
Part IV argues that the majority rule is unwise in theory and in
practice, as evidenced by the case of Baby K. Because EMTALA's
language is so vague, results similar to those in Baby K could be seen
again. Furthermore, the majority rule, by allowing the fully insured to
bring suit under both EMTALA and state malpractice law, could prove
to defeat the very purpose Congress intended for the Act. By potentially
increasing the number of lawsuits resulting from emergency room visits,
the majority rule could add to the cost of health care and ultimately give
hospitals more incentive to dump patients. Part V concludes with a
10. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
11. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
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recommendation to amend EMTALA by limiting its coverage to cases of
true dumping only or, at the very least, by incorporating into it the test
established in the later case of Power v. Arlington Hospital." As
discussed in Part IV, the Power test takes legitimate medical judgment
into account by allowing a physician or hospital to show that the test or
procedure at issue was not conducted because of medical, rather than
economic, reasons.
II. EMTALA
A. How EMTALA Works
EMTALA imposes a duty on hospitals that accept Medicare funds13
(ninety-eight percent of American hospitals) 4 to appropriately screen15
and stabilize" any individual who comes to their emergency departments
12. 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3) (1994); Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical
Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Okla. 1991).
14. Douglas S. Diekema, What Is Left of Futility? The Convergence of
Anencephaly and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 149 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1156, 1156 (1995).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994). The exact language of the screening
requirement reads:
(a) Medical screening requirement
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department,
if any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under
[Medicare]) comes to the emergency department and a request is
made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for
a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the
hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services
routinely available to the emergency department, to determine
whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the
meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994). The exact language of the stabilization
requirement reads:
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and
labor
(1) In general. If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits
under [Medicare]) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that
the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must
provide either-(A) within the staff and facilities available at the
hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as
may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or (B) for transfer
of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (c) of this section.
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seeking examination or treatment for an emergency medical condition.17
A hospital may choose to transfer a patient to another hospital if it first
complies with the requirements of the Act." A hospital that fails to
comply with EMTALA is subject to a civil money penalty of up to
$50,000 for each violation (or only $25,000 if the hospital has fewer than
100 beds). 9 Physicians are subject to a civil money penalty of up to
$50,000 per violation.' Patients who suffer personal harm as a direct
result of a hospital's violation can bring a civil action against that
hospital.2 Hospitals that suffer a direct financial loss as a result of
another hospital's violation of the Act can also bring a civil action against
the violating hospital. '
This Comment focuses on the courts' and the Department of Health
and Human Services' interpretations of EMTALA's stated coverage,
specifically the question of who can bring suit under the Act. The
language of EMTALA is vague in this regard. While the language makes
it clear that hospitals have a duty to screen and stabilize "any
individual"' who comes to an emergency room, nowhere does it
explicitly say whether or not plaintiffs must prove economic
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (1994). The Act defines an emergency medical
condition as follows:
(e) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "emergency medical condition" means-
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity including severe pain such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result
in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect
to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn
child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or,
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant wom[a]n who is having
contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer
to another hospital before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety
of the woman or the unborn child.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994). The statute limits damages to those
"available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located."
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
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discrimination. When the House Judiciary Committee was debating
EMTALA prior to its enactment, it expressed concern that the language
"did not precisely identify which parties could bring actions under the
provision" and that the "vagueness of the provision would not only leave
the rights and liabilities of the parties unclear, it also would place an
unnecessary burden on the courts to define these rights and liabilities. '
The Judiciary Committee amended EMTALA, but even its changes did
not resolve this issue once and for all; the pertinent amendment merely
limits the pool of potential plaintiffs to two types: "the individual patient
who suffers harm as a direct result of [a] hospital's failure to
appropriately screen, stabilize, or properly transfer" her, and "a medical
facility which received an improperly transferred" patient.' This bit of
legislative history does not answer the question of whether insured
patients should be allowed to bring EMTALA claims.
In fact, legislative history suggests that Congress never anticipated
that EMTALA would leave the courts guessing as to who could bring
claims under the Act. The very lack of an explicit effort to clarify
EMTALA's coverage can arguably be read to indicate that Congress
thought the matter too obvious to merit attention. The record shows that
the purpose of EMTALA was to prevent emergency rooms from dumping
the indigent and uninsured. The purpose of EMTALA was explained as
follows:
The [House Ways and Means] Committee is greatly concerned
about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency
rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency
conditions if the patient does not have medical insurance. The
Committee is most concerned that medically unstable patients
are not being treated appropriately. There have been reports of
situations where treatment was simply not provided. In
numerous other instances, patients in unstable condition have
been transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of
the receiving hospital.'
The House Judiciary Committee added, "[in recent years there has been
a growing concern about the provision of adequate emergency room
services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to the indigent and
uninsured."' 7 In Senate debate, Senator Orrin Hatch put it this way:
24. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 6, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 728.
25. Id.
26. Id. pt. 1, at 27.
27. Id. pt. 3, at 5.
1430
1995:1425 EMTALA Reexamined in Light of Baby K
The intent of this bill is honorable, that is to address concerns
about inadequate health care for our citizens who do not have
health insurance or who are 'underinsured' . ... There have
been disturbing reports about hospitals referring, and in some
instances refusing to treat patients who present themselves for
care, but who don't have health insurance. Others apparently
require a substantial cash deposit from uninsured patients before
admitting the individual for care. This has been referred to as
taking a 'wallet biopsy' before determining if the individual
merits treatment. 2
Because the stated purpose of EMTALA is to prevent emergency
rooms from dumping the indigent and uninsured, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress meant to limit the Act's coverage to those patients.
It is unfortunate that Congress overlooked the possibility of the current
controversy and chose such vague language. In choosing the phrase "any
individual," Congress set the stage for the courts to rule that anyone,
even the fully insured, may bring an action under EMTALA.
B. The Story Behind EMTALA: America's Patient Dumping Problem
Congress passed EMTALA for the express purpose of ensuring that
those who seek emergency room medical services receive adequate care,
regardless of their ability to pay.29 This action was considered necessary
to combat a despicable and growing phenomenon known as patient
"dumping."' A hospital "dumps" a patient when it either denies her
emergency care altogether or transfers her to another hospital's
emergency room without having stabilized her emergency condition,
despite being perfectly capable of treating her itself.3' Hospital
administrators euphemistically refer to this practice as "demarketing of
services" and "management of patient mix."3 2 Due to the unique
market-oriented nature of America's health care system, we are currently
28. S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 460-61 (1985).
29. H.R. REP. No. 241, supra note 24, pt. 3, at 5, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 726.
30. See e.g., Mary Jean Fell, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986: Providing Protection from Discrimination in Access to
Emergency Medical Care, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 607 (1994); Treiger, supra note 3.
31. Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 853-54
(S.D. Ind. 1989).
32. Emily Friedman, The "Dumping Dilemma": The PoorAreAlways With Some
of Us, HOSPITALS, Sept. 1, 1982, at 51.
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the only Western industrialized nation whose people are at risk of being
dumped. 33
Why does dumping occur? The answer is complicated.
Traditionally, American hospitals treated all the indigent and uninsured
who came to them.3 They were able to do this and still stay in business
thanks to the process known as "fee shifting. "M This meant that
hospitals treated the indigent and uninsured free of charge or for a
reduced fee and then made up for the resulting economic loss by charging
paying patients more than the actual cost of their own care.'
While the system of fee shifting worked well for many years, a
combination of forces has dramatically limited our hospitals' freedom to
compensate themselves for charity care losses this way. The first is the
huge increase in the number of uninsured Americans.3" The number
increased by fifty percent between 1976 and 1991 and totaled thirty-seven
million in 1992.' The cost of providing uncompensated care for them
went up along with their numbers. American hospitals provided an
estimated $10 billion in health care to the indigent and uninsured in
1989.39
Coupled with this overwhelming expense was pressure from both the
federal government and the insurance industry to cut medical costs.'
Prior to 1983, Medicare reimbursed hospitals practically any amount they
requested for patient care. Because there was no limit on reimbursement,
hospitals would sometimes keep Medicare patients longer than necessary
and give them every available test and treatment in order to maximize
33. Howard S. Berliner, Patient Dumping: No One Wins and We All Lose, 78
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1279, 1279 (1988); see also VICENTE NAVARRO, DANGEROUs TO
YouR HEALTH: CAPITALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1993); Milan Korcok, Patient Dumping:
The Ignoble Face of American Medicine, 132 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1064 (1985).
34. L.M. Beitsch, Economic Patient Dumping: Whose Life Is It Anyway?, 10 J.
LEGAL MED. 433, 441 (1989).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., DEAN C. CODDINGTON ET AL., THE CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE:
COSTS, CHOICES, AND STRATEGIES (1990); PAuL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 387-88 (1982).
37. HIMMELSTEIN & WOOLHANDLER, supra note 2, at 22-24.
38. Id.
39. Beitsch, supra note 34, at 443.
40. Congress explicitly mentioned this pressure in its explanation of EMTALA's
purpose: "There is some belief that [dumping] has worsened since the prospective
payment system for hospitals became effective. The Committee wants to provide a strong
assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency are not to be construed as license
to ignore traditional community responsibilities and loosen historic standards." H.R. REP.
NO. 241, supra note 24, pt. 1, at 27.
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profit. 41 In 1983, this cash cow was taken away. Medicare funding was
switched from a cost-based reimbursement system to a prospective
payment system. 2 Under the new system, the amount of money that
Medicare pays a hospital for a patient's care depends exclusively upon the
patient's diagnosis.' Amounts for payment are assigned to diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs), and the hospital receives only that amount."4 If
the actual cost to the hospital is less than that amount, the hospital can
keep the excess; if the actual cost is more than that amount, the hospital
must absorb the loss.' Under this new system, hospitals can no longer
overcharge Medicare to make up for the costs of treating the indigent and
uninsured.
Pressure to keep costs down has also come from the insurance
industry.' In the United States, most insured people obtain their health
insurance through their employment or that of a family member. 47
Employers, facing ever-increasing health insurance costs, have pitted
insurance companies against one another in fierce competition to reduce
the cost of insurance." The insurance companies, in turn, have put
pressure on the hospitals to keep costs down.49 One sure-fire way for
hospitals to lower costs for insurers is to refuse treatment to those who
cannot pay, thereby reducing the need for fee shifting. Everybody wins,
except the indigent and uninsured.
The result of all this pressure on hospitals has been an increase in the
incidence of dumping.' In Dallas, for example, transfers of patients
from one hospital's emergency room to another's (presumably motivated,
in most cases, by economic concerns) increased from 70 per month in
1982 to more than 200 per month in 1983."' In Washington, D.C.,
patient transfers rose from 169 per year in 1981 to 930 per year in
1985.52
41. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS'
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 15 (1993).
42. LINDA BRuBAKER ROPES, HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 8 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Beitsch, supra note 34, at 444.
45. ROPES, supra note 42, at 8.
46. Beitsch, supra note 34, at 445.
47. Nancy De Lew et al., A Layman's Guide to the U.S. Health Care System,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Fall 1992, at 151, 151-52.
48. Beitsch, supra note 34, at 445.
49. Id.
50. Leo Uzych, Patient Dumping, J. FLA. MED. ASs'N, Feb. 1990, at 97, 98.
51. David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications,
and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500, 1500 (1987).
52. Id.
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Dumping can be very dangerous, even fatal, for those who are
dumped. While most dumping involves an actual transfer to another
hospital's emergency room, some hospitals have done as little as hand out
maps with directions to the local public hospital. 3 Even when a patient
is physically taken to another hospital, the transfer itself can delay
treatment for hours.' Because emergency medical conditions by their
very nature require immediate attention, any delay in treatment can have
serious consequences in terms of increasing the likelihood of permanent
disability or even death.55
Dumping is an unconscionable disgrace to the American health care
system. While the pressure to cut costs is undeniably overwhelming,
hospitals and physicians who dump patients endanger lives. Through
EMTALA, Congress made a noble attempt to end this contemptible
practice. But it did not pay careful enough attention to the statute's
language, and the courts have been left to clear up the resulting confusion
themselves.
III. THE DIvISION AMONG THE COURTS IN INTERPRETING EMTALA's
COVERAGE
Because Congress phrased EMTALA to apply to "any individual,"'
after having stated that the purpose of the statute was to prevent hospitals
from dumping the indigent and the uninsured,57 the courts have been left
to determine for themselves whether "any individual" really means any
individual or, rather, any individual who is unable to pay for the
emergency medical treatment he needs. Of the federal courts that have
decided this issue, a minority, comprised only of district courts, has ruled
in favor of limiting EMTALA's application to cases of economically
motivated dumping. The majority, including all the federal appellate
courts that have addressed this question, has decided in favor of universal
coverage.
53. Friedman, supra note 32, at 55.
54. Ansell & Schiff, supra note 51, at 1501.
55. Id.; Friedman, supra note 32, at 52.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
57. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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A. The Minority Rule
At least five district courts have ruled that EMTALA applies only in
cases of economically motivated dumping.58 Because two of those five
decisions have been overruled," only the three that still stand will be
discussed here. In order to emphasize the level of confusion present in
this debate, a sixth decision with an ambiguous holding' will also be
discussed.
In the first case, Nichols v. Estabrook,"1 the parents of a
deceased infant brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire against Dr. Estabrook, the emergency room
physician who examined their son shortly before their son's death.'2
The parents brought the baby to the emergency room because he was
suffering from vomiting and diarrhea.' Dr. Estabrook examined the
baby, conducted a blood test, and diagnosed dehydration along with a flu
or other virus." He recommended that the parents drive their baby to
another hospital, fifteen minutes away, where they would meet their usual
pediatrician.' The baby died forty-five minutes after arriving at the
second hospital.' The baby's pediatrician testified that the results of the
blood test were "really bad" and that Dr. Estabrook should have started
an intravenous line in the baby immediately.67
The parents argued that the court should have imposed liability on
Dr. Estabrook based on an alleged statutory duty (created under
EMTALA) to make correct diagnoses." The court rejected this
58. Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992); Coleman v.
McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Okla.
1991), overruled by Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992);
ZaiKaner v. Danaher, No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1990);
Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F.
Supp. 325, 329-30 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495,
497-98 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
59. Coleman, 771 F. Supp. 343, overruled by Collins, 963 F.2d 303. The court
in Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992), rejected the holding of Stewart,
731 F. Supp. 433, and refused to follow it.
60. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
61. 741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989).
62. Section 1395dd(d) of the statute allows for the imposition of civil monetary
penalties against both the hospital and the physician responsible for the examination or
transfer (depending upon the nature of the violation). 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (1994).
63. Nichols, 741 F. Supp. at 326.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 329.
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argument.' Because the parents were essentially alleging that Dr.
Estabrook had misdiagnosed their baby and not that the transfer was
motivated by economic reasons, the court granted Dr. Estabrook's motion
for summary judgment on the EMTALA claim.' The court examined
EMTALA's legislative history and held that Congress' intent in passing
the Act was "to provide some assurance that patients with emergency
medical conditions will be examined and treated regardless of their
financial resources."71 In light of this legislative history, the court held
that the interest which Congress sought to protect by enacting EMTALA
was not an issue present in this case."
The second case, Evitt v. University Heights Hospital,' also
involved a misdiagnosis. The plaintiff, Willette Faye Evitt, went to the
emergency room at Indianapolis' University Heights Hospital because she
was experiencing severe chest pain.74 There, a physician on duty
diagnosed costochondritis (inflammation of the chest wall), ordered her
to stop taking one medication and to start taking another, and advised her
to return to the hospital if the pain worsened.75 She returned to the
emergency room later that same day, after the pain had increased. 6 At
that time, the physicians who examined her determined that she had
suffered a heart attack.'
Evitt's claims involved only her first visit to the emergency room.7
She claimed that the hospital violated EMTALA at that time either by not
providing her with a proper screening exam or by not stabilizing her
condition and properly transferring her to another hospital.' In essence,
she accused the hospital of incorrectly diagnosing her ailment. She did
not allege that the hospital's misdiagnosis was economically motivated.'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
examined EMTALA's legislative history and ruled that EMTALA did not
ensure correct diagnoses for emergency room patients." The court
reasoned:
69. Id. at 330.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
74. Id. at 496.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 498.
81. Id. at 497-98.
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The plaintiff's interpretation reaches beyond the purpose of the
statute, which is specifically directed toward preventing
prospective patients from being turned away for economic reasons
. . . .Taking the plaintiff's argument to its'logical conclusion
would lead to the result that any patient dissatisfied with an
emergency room diagnosis and release could sue the hospital
under the anti-dumping provision. This construction would, in
effect, make the Hospital the guarantor of the physicians'
diagnosis and treatment irrespective of how reasonable such
diagnosis may have appeared at the time of the patient's release
.... We do not believe that the federal statute goes so far."
The court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment and
held that Evitt's allegation that the diagnosis was incorrect "obviously
states a mere malpractice claim which should be resolved in state
court."" The court also ruled that allowing Evitt's suit under EMTALA
would result in federal preemption of state malpractice law. 5
In the third case, ZaiKaner v. Danaher," the daughter of yet another
misdiagnosed patient brought suit against Dr. Danaher, the physician who
examined Mr. ZaiKaner in an emergency room. Ms. ZaiKaner had
persuaded her father to visit the emergency room after he complained of
not feeling well.87 After arriving at the emergency room, he was
examined and then moved into the hospital's coronary care unit."'
Because Ms. ZaiKaner was unsatisfied with the care, attention, and
treatment that her father was receiving there, she demanded that he be
transferred to another hospital." Mr. ZaiKaner died in the ambulance
en route to the other hospital.'
Ms. ZaiKaner brought suit under EMTALA against the first hospital.
Because it was undisputed that Mr. ZaiKaner was never denied treatment
or involuntarily discharged and that his transfer was initiated at his
daughter's request, no evidence of economically motivated dumping
82. Id.
83. Id. at 498.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 497. Besides the fact that this ruling was unnecessary to keep Evitt's
claim out of federal court, the court's concerns about preemption proved to be unfounded.
Several courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring suit under both EMTALA and state
malpractice laws. See, e.g., Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir.
1992); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990).
86. No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1990).
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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existed. 9 The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, pointing to "the availability of state tort remedies for
negligence claims and the clear legislative history of [EMTALA]," ruled
that a plaintiff must allege economically motivated dumping in order to
bring a claim under that statute.9 The court granted the hospital's
motion for summary judgment based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."
In another case, Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc.,g the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary
judgment to the defendants in an EMTALA suit based, among other
reasons, on the fact that the plaintiff did not allege economically
motivated dumping," The court reasoned that:
this claim for improper emergency room diagnosis and treatment
is a traditional medical malpractice claim not cognizable under
EMTALA because it is uncontroverted that Tolton was never
denied treatment due to inability to pay or lack of insurance,
known as "patient dumping," the central problem sought to be
addressed by the Act.'
This was despite the fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit had already ruled in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group,
Inc. that economically motivated dumping need not be alleged in order to
bring an EMTALA claim.' The Tolton court cited language from the
Cleland decision and claimed to be following that case, yet it held the
exact opposite.98 In light of the fact that the circuit court had already
ruled differently, Tolton is not binding law. However, the fact that the
Tolton court claimed to be following Cleland when it actually held the
reverse points to the level of confusion among the courts in deciding the
extent of EMTALA's coverage.
B. The Majority Rule
The courts that have ruled that EMTALA applies to everyone do not
follow the same neat pattern that the limiting cases have followed. While
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at **2-3.
93. id. at *3.
94. 854 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
95. Id. at 511.
96. Id.
97. 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990).
98. Tolton, 854 F. Supp. at 511.
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these courts have all ruled that the relevant portion of the statute should
be read literally, their reasons for doing so have sometimes taken very
different turns.
The first case to come out on the side of the debate that argues that
anyone can bring a claim under EMTALA was Deberry v. Sherman
Hospital Ass'n.' Ms. Deberry's daughter was complaining of a fever,
rash, irritability, lethargy, and a stiff neck tilted to the left. Because of
these symptoms, Ms. Deberry's brought her daughter to the defendant's
emergency room.110 The girl received treatment but returned two days
later and was diagnosed with spinal meningitis.101 The disease left her
deaf."° The mother sued the hospital under both state malpractice law
and EMTALA.'03
The hospital argued that EMTALA applies only when a patient is
refused any treatment at all (as opposed to inadequate treatment) based on
her inability to pay.'°4 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois rejected both prongs of this argument. It ruled that the
statute should be read literally and that, because "indigency" (or any
synonym for it) never appears in the statute, EMTALA should be
construed to cover everyone. 5 Under this rule, a hospital's motive is
irrelevant."°  The court also ruled that a hospital does not have to
refuse treatment altogether to violate the statute." 7 The court denied
the hospital's motion to dismiss the EMTALA portion of the case."°8
The court also explicitly rejected the Evitt court's assertion that a broad
interpretation of EMTALA's application would preempt state malpractice
law."°
Under the Deberry rule, a cause of action under EMTALA might be
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from a common law malpractice
complaint. One would only need to allege that he was misdiagnosed in
order to claim an EMTALA violation. The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit took a step towards distinguishing these
causes of action with its decision in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corp. "' The plaintiff, Mrs. Gatewood, sued after her husband was
99. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. I11. 1990).
100. Id. at 1303.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1305.
105. Id. at 1306.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1307.
109. Id.
110. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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misdiagnosed by the defendant's hospital. 1" Mr. Gatewood, who was
fully insured, visited the emergency room because he was experiencing
chest pain that radiated down his left arm."1  Physicians there
performed blood tests, a chest X-ray, and an EKG test before diagnosing
Mr. Gatewood with musculoskeletal pain." 3 They advised him to use
a heating pad, take Tylenol, and make a follow-up appointment with his
personal physician.1 4 The next morning, Mr. Gatewood died of a heart
attack. 11 5
Mrs. Gatewood brought actions under both EMTALA and state
malpractice law. 6 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the EMTALA
claim. 7 It relied on EMTALA's legislative history and held that Mrs.
Gatewood could not bring an action under the statute because her husband
was fully insured.1"' The court of appeals reversed that ruling,
reasoning that, because "the Act itself draws no distinction between
persons with and without insurance," it should be construed to cover
everyone.1 9 However, the court affirmed the district court's decision
on other grounds. It held that Mrs. Gatewood's allegation of a
misdiagnosis was not actionable under EMTALA.1" The court ruled
that EMTALA does not create "a sweeping federal cause of action with
respect to what are traditional state-based claims of negligence or
malpractice."2 ' It further reasoned that EMTALA is not intended "to
ensure each emergency room patient a correct diagnosis" but rather "to
create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort law,
for what amounts to failure to treat.""
The court offered guidelines for separating the two types of claims.
It ruled that "what constitutes an appropriate screening is properly
determined not by reference to particular outcomes, but instead by
reference to a hospital's standard screening procedures. " " In other
words, if a hospital screens a plaintiff the same way it would screen
anyone else, it does not violate EMTALA. If, despite the standard
111. Id. at 1039.
112. Id.
113. id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. ld. at 1040.
120. Id. at 1041.
121. Ad.
122. ld.
123. Id.
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screening procedure, a physician makes a mistake in diagnosis or
treatment, the plaintiff must look to state malpractice laws to determine
whether the physician acted negligently.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed the
same reasoning in Collins v. DePaul Hospital.12" The plaintiff, Mr.
Collins, was involved in a near-fatal all-terrain vehicle accident."- He
sustained serious injuries, including a fractured skull, a collapsed lung,
a fractured hip, and numerous abrasions and lacerations."2 After he
was taken to the hospital, the emergency room staff did not take an X-ray
of his hip and, because they were unaware that it was fractured, did not
treat it.2 Mr. Collins was unconscious when brought to the emergency
room and remained so for more than two weeks."2 When he finally
woke up and began to move around, he complained of pain in his
hip."2  By that time, it was too late to treat the fracture at DePaul
Hospital. Mr. Collins was referred to a hospital in Colorado, where a hip
fusion was performed."3  One of Mr. Collins' legs was made
permanently shorter than the other during the hip fusion operation. 3
Mr. Collins brought suit under both state malpractice law and
EMTALA.3 2  His EMTALA claim was based on a theory that the
hospital, in failing to X-ray his hip, violated EMTALA by providing an
inadequate screening exam.' The district court granted the hospital's
motion for summary judgment."M The court of appeals affirmed.
Although the court held that Mr. Collins, who could and did pay his
hospital bills, 35 was eligible to bring an EMTALA action, it followed
the reasoning set forth in Gatewood and held that Mr. Collins' claim was
a malpractice claim, not an EMTALA claim." The hospital screened
Mr. Collins, determined that an emergency medical condition did exist,
and placed him in the intensive care unit, where it treated him for twenty-
124. 963 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
125. id. at 306.
126. Id. at 304.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 306.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. id.
132. Id. at 308. He lost in the malpractice case. Id. at 304 n.2.
133. Id. at 306.
134. Id. at 304.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 307.
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six days.'37 While the hospital did miss diagnosing the hip fracture, it
did not dump Mr. Collins.'
In Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning from Collins and
Gatewood and found that the defendant had complied with EMTALA's
requirements.' The plaintiff, Ms. Brooker, visited the defendant
hospital's emergency room because she was experiencing chest pains."
She was diagnosed with a probable heart attack, and the attending
physician recommended emergency surgery.' 4' The hospital's cardiac
surgeon was unavailable to perform the surgery, so the attending
physician recommended transferring Ms. Brooker to another hospital. 42
Ms. Brooker consented to the transfer. 43 She claimed in her suit that
an EKG performed at the second hospital showed that she suffered yet
another heart attack as a result of the transfer.'" Her EMTALA claim
rested upon an alleged failure to stabilize her emergency medical
condition prior to the transfer. 45
The hospital argued that there could be no EMTALA claim unless the
patient is indigent or uninsured.'" The court, citing Gatewood and
Cleland, ruled that EMTALA's coverage is not so limited. 47 However,
the court affirmed the district court's holding that Ms. Brooker had not
proven that the hospital violated EMTALA's stabilization
requirement. 4 '
The rules from Gatewood, Collins, and Brooker can be explained
fairly simply: a hospital must use the same screening procedure for every
patient who seeks emergency care. If an emergency medical condition
exists, and the hospital detects it and proceeds to treat or stabilize it
before transferring a patient, the hospital has complied with EMTALA's
requirements. If an emergency medical condition exists, and the hospital
uses a substandard screening procedure that prevents it from detecting the
condition, the hospital has violated EMTALA. If the hospital uses its
standard screening procedure but nevertheless fails to detect the condition,
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 413.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 413-14.
143. ld. at 414.
144. Sd.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id. at 414.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 415.
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it has complied with EMTALA, and state malpractice law should decide
the case.
Put into practice, however, the rule might not always be so simple to
apply. A potential problem with the rule could be determining what
constitutes an adequate or standard screening. Another problem is
overlap with state malpractice law. Both share the same goal: to decide
whether treatment has fallen below a certain standard. With no need to
prove an economic motive, an EMTALA action is indistinguishable from
a malpractice claim.
In Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc. ," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish EMTALA
claims from malpractice claims by allowing a broad examination of a
defendant's motive. The plaintiffs in Cleland brought their adolescent son
to the defendant's hospital because he was experiencing cramps and
vomiting." A physician in the emergency room diagnosed influenza
and discharged him."' This diagnosis was incorrect.'52 In truth, the
boy was suffering from intussusception (a condition where the intestine
slides into itself, like a telescope) and died the next day.' 53 His parents
sued the hospital under both EMTALA and state malpractice law."
Because plaintiffs alleged no economically motivated dumping, the district
court dismissed their complaint under the theory that EMTALA applies
only to indigent and uninsured patients.'55
The court of appeals, however, ruled that the statute should be read
literally, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." The court
ruled that EMTALA does not apply only to the indigent and
uninsured.' 57  The court also ruled that courts should not use a
malpractice standard of care to determine the appropriateness of the
screening a plaintiff received; instead, courts should examine the
hospital's motives for screening the patient the way it did.' If the
hospital screened the patient the same way it would have screened any
other patient, then the screening was "appropriate" within the meaning of
the statute. 59 The court claimed that this was not "a backdoor means
149. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 268.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 270.
157. Id. at 268.
158. Id. at 272.
159. Id.
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of limiting coverage to the indigent or uninsured" because non-financial
motives could cause a hospital to provide substandard care, such as
racism, sexism, or prejudice based on the patient's drunkenness or HIV-
positive status."w Any improper motive, whether monetary or not,
would be enough to violate EMTALA under Cleland. However, proving
a non-economic motive could be quite difficult. This is precisely the
reason that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Cleland rule in Power v. Arlington Hospital
Ass 'n. 161
C. The Case of Baby K, A Recent Majority Rule Decision
1. INTRODUCTION
In the case of In re Baby K, 62 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit followed the majority rule and used EMTALA to
settle a dispute between a hospital and an insured patient's mother and,
in doing so, discounted the hospital's legitimate medical and ethical
expertise. The patient was born with anencephaly, a fatal absence of
most or all of the brain. Her mother, citing religious beliefs, insisted that
the hospital resuscitate the baby every time she stopped breathing on her
own. The court held that EMTALA required the hospital to provide
ventilator treatment, 1" despite the fact that it is universally considered
medically and ethically inappropriate to resuscitate anencephalics.
This decision poignantly highlights the problem with the majority rule
that allows the fully insured to bring suit under EMTALA. Whereas the
earlier majority decisions were arguably dicta in that no EMTALA
violations were actually found, the hospital in Baby K was warned by the
court that its planned course of action (to refuse to resuscitate Baby K)
would violate EMTALA. Here, the Fourth Circuit used EMTALA to
override a legitimate medical and ethical decision, despite the fact that
EMTALA was meant to override financial decisions only.
160. Id.
161. 42 F.3d 851, 857 (4th Cir. 1994).
162. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
163. Id. at 592.
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2. SOME NOTES ON ANENCEPHALY
Anencephaly is a fatal birth defect. It is the absence of most or all
of the brain, as well as much of the skull and scalp.'" The brainstem,
which regulates the most basic bodily functions (for example, breathing),
may be anywhere from relatively normal to totally absent." No
medical treatment can improve the condition of anencephalic babies: they
are born dying, if they are born alive at all."t
Anencephaly can be detected through amniocentesis and via
ultrasound. Amniocentesis detects a type of alphafetoprotein in a
mother's amniotic fluid if her fetus is anencephalic. 67 Ultrasound
reveals the irregularity of an anencephalic fetus' head.' Because of
the danger present in delivering a baby whose skull is imperfect and
because anencephalic babies are certain to die soon after birth (if they are
even born alive), most anencephalics detected in utero are aborted. 1 9
Anencephaly is one of the few cases in which third trimester abortions are
encouraged by physicians." Of those not aborted, it is estimated that
from fifty to ninety-five percent are stillborn.171 Those born alive do
not live very long, usually dying within a matter of hours or days.1 2
The cause of death varies from case to case but generally involves one or
more of the following: injuries to the head and nerve tissue sustained
during birth (because of the open skull), infection, poor temperature
regulation, or organ failure (one-third to one-half of anencephalics are
born with gross malformations of at least one other organ system).l"
164. David A. Stumpf et al., The Infant with Anencephaly, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 669, 669 (1990).
165. D. Alan Shewmon, Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov. 1988, at 11.
166. PAUL RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL
INTERSECTIONS 213 (1978); see also Alexander M. Capron, Anencephalic Donors:
Separate the Dead from the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 5.
167. M.A. Ferguson-Smith, The Reduction ofAnencephalic and Spina Bfida Births
by Maternal Serum Alphafetoprotein Screening, 39 BRIT. MED. BULL. 365, 365 (1983).
168. Id. at 367.
169. One study found the rate of abortion to be 95%. Shewmon, supra note 165,
at 12.
170. Frank A. Chervenak et al., When Is Termination of Pregnancy During the
Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (1984).
171. Shewmon, supra note 165, at 13.
172. P.A. Baird & A.D. Sadovnick, Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 268, 270 (1984).
173. Norman Fost, Organs from Anencephalic Infants: An Idea Whose Tune Has
Not Yet Come, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1988, at 6; Shewmon, supra note 165, at
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The standard treatment given to anencephalics consists of warmth,
hydration, and nutrition.17 Physicians and bioethicists agree that
prolonging an anencephalic's life is medically inappropriate and
unethical." This is the main reason for the controversy surrounding
the use of anencephalics as organ donors, an experimental practice which
began in the 1960's, died out quickly, and was revived again during the
1980's.176 Ethically speaking, organs cannot be taken from a person
who is not completely brain-dead." 7  Because many anencephalics'
brain stems function for a while after birth, these babies cannot be used
as organ donors until they die of natural causes. If they are allowed to
die a natural death, their organs usually suffer damage by the time the
babies reach full cardio-respiratory arrest.17 In order to facilitate
transplants from anencephalic babies, some physicians have proposed
keeping the babies on ventilators to keep their organs intact until they can
be harvested." 9  Their proposals, along with the very notion that
174. DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEWBORN 599 (Chester A. Swinyard
ed., 1978); ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENTOF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS:
MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 138 (1984).
175. Even Dr. C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon General, pediatric surgeon, and
well-known proponent of aggressive measures to save defective babies, believes that
anencephalics should not be treated:
Medicine may never have all the solutions to all the problems that
occur at birth. I personally foresee no medical solution to a cephalodymus or
an anencephalic child .... In these cases the prognosis is an early and merciful
death by natural causes. There are no so-called "heroic measures" possible, and
intervention would merely prolong the patient's process of dying. Some of
nature's errors are extraordinary and frightening . . . but nature also has the
kindness to take them away. For such infants, neither medicine nor law can be
of any help. And neither medicine nor law should prolong these infants'
process of dying.
Treatment of Infants Born with Handicapping Conditions: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1982) (statement of C. Everett Koop), quoted in REM B. EDWARDS & GLENN C.
GRABER, BIOETmCs 511 (1988); see also RAMSEY, supra note 166, at 212-24; Chervenak
et al., supra note 170, at 502; Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics,
Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 565, 565 (1983).
176. James W. Walters & Stephen Ashwal, Organ Prolongation in Anencephalic
Infants: Ethical & Medical Issues, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1988, at 19-20.
177. Michael R. Harrison, The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at 21. At least one case has gone to trial on this issue. In that
case, the parents of an anencephalic baby wanted the court to declare their baby dead so
that they could donate her organs. The court refused their request. In re T.A.C.P., 609
So. 2d 588, 595 (Fla. 1992).
178. T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 595; George J. Annas, From Canada with Love:
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1987, at 36.
179. This proposal was actually carried out in at least one case. Annas, supra note
178, at 36.
1995:1425 EMTAL4 Reexamined in Light of Baby K
anencephalics should be used as organ donors, have been swiftly rejected
by bioethicists and the medical profession because of the universally held
belief that ventilator support for anencephalics is medically and ethicallyinappropriate. "~
3. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Baby K was diagnosed with anencephaly before birth."' Her
mother, Contrenia Harrell, belonged to the Kaiser Permanente Health
Maintenance Organization, which covered the cost of Baby K's medical
care.12 Despite recommendations from her obstetrician and a
neonatologist that she abort the fetus, Ms. Harrell insisted on carrying the
baby to term." Baby K was delivered via cesarean section on October
13, 1992, at Fairfax Hospital in Falls Church, Virginia.'" Because the
baby was experiencing difficulty breathing at birth, she was placed on
mechanical ventilation in order to give the hospital time to explain her
prognosis to her mother."8 5
Baby K's physicians explained to Ms. Harrell that no treatment was
available for the condition, that ventilator support served no therapeutic
or palliative purpose, and that such treatment was considered medically
unnecessary and inappropriate. Despite these statements, when the
physicians attempted to persuade Ms. Harrell to allow them to place a
"Do Not Resuscitate" order on Baby K's chart, she refused." She
based her refusal on her religious beliefs. She realized that physicians
could not make her daughter better but believed that God would work a
miracle to heal her'87 and allow her to grow up to be just like other
180. Id. at 37; see also Fost, supra note 173.
181. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1024-25 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d
590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
182. Bill Miller, Baby K's Mother Gives Her the Prayer That Many Deny She Has,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al.
183. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
184. Id. at 1024-25.
185. Mechanical ventilation is considered medically and ethically inappropriate for
anencephalics, who are seen as receiving no benefit from such assistance, other than
prolonged death. Id. at 1025; see also Chervenak et al., supra note 170, at 502;
Shewmon, supra note 165, at 15. At least one commentator has suggested that the
hospital should have simply allowed Baby K to die at birth. By placing her on mechanical
ventilation, the hospital gave her mother the impression that it was willing to provide this
inappropriate treatment. George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of
Emergency Care: The Case of Baby K, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1543 (1994).
186. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
187. Id. During a television interview, she explained, "I'm also believing that
God is going to heal Stephanie. If the doctors can't do anything to fix her condition, I
believe that God can." Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1994).
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children.188 She believed that "God, and not other humans," should
decide the moment of her daughter's death.'"
After Ms. Harrell refused to allow the "Do Not Resuscitate" order,
the baby's physicians sought guidance from the hospital's ethics
committee. 1°  An ethics subcommittee composed of a family
practitioner, a psychiatrist, and a minister recommended that Baby K's
ventilator treatment should end. 9' They recommended that, should Ms.
Harrell refuse to consent, the hospital should seek permission through the
legal system.'
Before pursuing legal action, the hospital decided to transfer the baby
to another facility."9 The only other area hospitals with pediatric
intensive care units, Children's Hospital and Georgetown University
Medical Center, both refused to accept Baby K."9  The hospital
eventually found a nursing home willing to accept her.'95 Ms. Harrell
agreed to the transfer once the hospital promised to readmit Baby K for
emergency treatment should she stop breathing on her own again."
She was transferred to the nursing home on November 30, 1992 but again
experienced respiratory difficulties on January 15, 1993, and was returned
188. Carol J. Castaneda, Baby K-Now Stephanie-Turns 2, USA TODAY, Oct.
13, 1994, at 3A.
189. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025-26. Although Ms. Harrell has every right to
her religious beliefs, this argument is illogical. Humans put her baby on a ventilator.
Humans operate that ventilator. This use of man-made machinery to artificially support
the baby's life arguably has nothing to do with God's will. When confronted with this
fact during a television interview, she replied, "I can't accept that [Baby K's death] is his
will." Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 14, 1995). Ms. Harrell has also
expressed a belief that the hospital's attempt to refuse treatment was motivated by
financial concerns. Miller, supra note 182, at Al. This makes no sense, either. The
hospital was reimbursed in full by Ms. Harrell's HMO and quite probably made a profit.
And by involving itself in this legal battle, it was certain to lose money.
190. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
191. id.
192. Id. at 1025-26. Bioethicist George Annas argues that this move was a
mistake. He suggests that the hospital should have simply refused to perform the next
resuscitation, a move that would not have violated the established standard of care for
anencephalics. Annas, supra note 185, at 1543.
193. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
194. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 594 n.5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994); Brief for Appellants at 6, Baby K (No. 93-1899(L)). Interestingly enough, the
only expert to testify that hospitals do have a duty to resuscitate anencephalics was an
ethicist from Georgetown University, one of the hospitals that refused to admit Baby K
for care. Id. at 6 n.1.
195. The nursing home costs, which totalled almost half a million dollars as of
November, 1994, are being paid by Ms. Harrell's HMO and by Medicaid. Miller, supra
note 182, at Al; Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1994).
196. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
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to the hospital.1" The hospital tried once more to persuade Ms. Harrell
to discontinue the ventilator treatment, but again she refused.1' Baby
K remained on a ventilator until February 12 and then returned to the
nursing home." Baby K experienced breathing difficulties once more
on March 3 and returned to the hospital.' During that visit, a
breathing tube was surgically implanted into her trachea so that she would
not need to be intubated every time she returned to the hospital."' She
was transferred to the nursing home again on April 13.1
The hospital proceeded to file for declaratory and injunctive relief in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.' The
hospital sought relief under EMTALA and an array of other statutes: the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,' the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990," the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984," and Virginia's
Medical Malpractice Act.' The hospital also requested that a guardian
ad litem be appointed for the baby." Both the guardian ad litem and
the baby's father, Mr. K," agreed with the hospital's position in the
case.
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4. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
The district court characterized Baby K's respiratory distress as an
emergency medical condition covered by EMTALA and held that the
hospital would be acting in violation of EMTALA if it were to refuse to
resuscitate Baby K.21 While the hospital had argued that prolonging
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. id.
200. Id. at 1025-26.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1026. Baby K finally died in early April, 1995. Marylou Tousignant
& Bill Miller, Death of "Baby K" Leaves a Legacy of Legal Precedents, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 1995, at B3.
203. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (1994).
207. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1994).
208. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993).
209. Mr. K and Ms. Harrell have never been married. Id. at 1025. Mr. K has
explained his position: "What chance does this child have to live or grow up or have any
fun in life? Lying on her back, 365 days a year, that's no life. She's just a vegetable.
How can anybody let the child she loves be a vegetable?" Miller, supra note 182, at Al.
210. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
211. Id. at 1026-27.
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the life of an anencephalic is medically futile and inhumane," the court
ruled that this matter is irrelevant, given that the statute makes no
exception for futile or inhumane treatment.213  The court further
reasoned that, following the hospital's logic, hospitals should refuse to
treat people with AIDS or cancer who are injured in an accident because
they are just going to die someday, anyway.21
5. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
The hospital, Mr. K., and the guardian ad litem appealed the decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The
American Academy of Pediatrics and the Society of Critical Care
Medicine filed amicus briefs in support of the appellants' position. The
Department for Rights of Virginians with Disabilities filed an amicus brief
in support of Ms. Harrell.215 The appellants appealed all the district
court's holdings, but the court of appeals held that it need look no further
212. The hospital's characterization of ventilator treatment for anencephalics as
futile and inhumane comports with medical standards. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 178,
at 37; Chervenak et al., supra note 170, at 502; R.A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die,
229 JAMA 172 (1974).
213. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
214. Id. The court also held that it could not decide whether the Child Abuse Act
would prohibit refusal to treat unless the Virginia Child Protective Services were to join
as a party to the case. Id. at 1029. In fact, however, the Department of Health and
Human Services, in its regulations promulgated to administer the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984, specifically declared that medical treatment beyond nutrition,
hydration, and medication should not be given to chronically and irreversibly comatose
infants like Baby K. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (1994). The court also held that the
hospital was prohibited from refusing to treat Baby K based on her handicapped status by
the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Baby K, 832 F. Supp.
at 1028-29. The court declined to decide whether Virginia's malpractice statutes or
common law would prohibit refusal to treat, citing the fact that neither had established a
standard of care for anencephalics. Id. at 1029-30.
The court also held that Ms. Harrell's right to bring up her child as she saw fit was
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 1030. The court
further held that the Due Process Clause extended to a parent's right to make medical
treatment decisions for her child. Id. In light of the fact that Mr. K sided with the
hospital, the court held that in a dispute between two parents regarding the termination
of life support, the court must decide in favor of the parent who wants to continue life
support. Id. (citing In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992)). The court also held that
the guardian ad litem's opinion was irrelevant. Id. at 1031 n.2. In addition, the court
held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Virginia Constitution all
guaranteed Baby K's right to life. Id. The court also held that the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause protected Harrell's right to her religious convictions. Id.
215. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994).
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than EMTALA, as that statute's requirements alone were sufficient to
impose a duty on the hospital to resuscitate Baby K.216 While the
appellants did not argue that EMTALA should not apply to Baby K due
to her insured status, the court did speak to this point. The court cited
Brooker, Gatewood, Cleland, and Baber v. Hospital Corp. of
America. 7 as authority for the proposition that EMTALA applies to all
patients who have an emergency medical condition.21
The appellants offered four arguments. Relying on Baber and Brooks
v. Maryland General Hospital,"9 they first argued that EMTALA
merely requires hospitals to provide the same treatment to patients in the
same medical condition.' Under this theory, the hospital would not
violate EMTALA if it were to provide Baby K with the same treatment
it provides to all other anencephalics. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the language referred to in Baber and Brooks concerned
EMTALA's screening requirement, not its stabilization requirement. 1
Contrary to standard medical opinion, the court held that Baby K's
emergency medical condition was respiratory distress, not anencephaly,
and that EMTALA requires the hospital to provide stabilizing treatment
(that is, resuscitation) to anyone who has stopped breathing on her
own.2
The appellants also argued that Congress could not have intended for
EMTALA to require physicians to provide treatment outside the
prevailing standard of medical care.' Under this argument, the
hospital would not be required to provide ventilator support to Baby K,
as that treatment falls outside the prevailing standard of medical care for
anencephalics. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the plain
language of the Act makes no exceptions for treatment outside the
prevailing standard of medical care.' The court reiterated EMTALA's
language that requires hospitals to provide stabilizing treatment to any
individual who presents an emergency medical condition.'
The appellants further argued that an interpretation of EMTALA that
requires physicians to provide ventilator support to anencephalics against
216. Id. at 592.
217. 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992). In Baber, the Fourth Circuit did not
explicitly address the issue of EMTALA's application.
218. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593-94.
219. 996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993).
220. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 595.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 596.
223. Id. at 595.
224. Id. at 596.
225. Id.
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their will ignores a Virginia law' that allows physicians to refuse to
provide treatment they consider medically or ethically inappropriate. 7
The court rejected this argument as well, reasoning that EMTALA's plain
language makes no exceptions for treatment that physicians consider to be
medically or ethically inappropriate.' The court held that because
EMTALA preempts state and local laws that conflict with its purpose,'
the Virginia law was preempted."' The appellants also argued that
EMTALA's requirement of stabilization applies only when a hospital is
going to transfer a patient.3' This argument ignored some of
EMTALA's language, 2 and the court rightly rejected it.'
The court concluded its opinion with a statement that deciding the
moral or ethical propriety of providing treatment of this kind to
anencephalics is beyond the limits of the court's judicial function.'
The court further reasoned that it is bound to follow the plain language
of EMTALA and any expressed congressional intent, and neither of those
provided exceptions for anencephalics." 5 The court then compared
Baby K's anencephaly to the condition of comatose patients, people with
lung cancer, and people suffering from muscular dystrophy. Those
people all might require repeated sessions of respiratory assistance, but
they are not denied that treatment even though they will ultimately die as
a result of their conditions.'
Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse filed a dissenting opinion. He reasoned
that Congress could not have intended for EMTALA to supersede
physicians' sensitive decision-making process at the end of a patient's
life. 7 He also reasoned that EMTALA should not apply in Baby K's
case for two other reasons. First of all, there was no allegation of true
patient dumping." Second, Baby K was not the type of emergency
patient contemplated by the statute. 9  Judge Sprouse held that
anencephaly, and not respiratory distress, was Baby K's relevant
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie Supp. 1993).
227. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 595.
228. Id. at 597.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(t) (1994).
230. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
231. Id. at 595.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(a) (1994) requires hospitals to stabilize an
emergency medical condition (or to provide for treatment of a pregnant woman's labor).
233. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597-98.
234. Id. at 598.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
1452
1995:1425 EMTALA Reexamined in Light of Baby K
condition.' Respiratory distress is one of the conditions or symptoms
that accompany this birth defect. Her symptoms should have been viewed
as being found along a continuum rather than as being a series of discrete
emergency medical conditions to be considered in isolation." Because
there was nothing physicians could do to improve Baby K's condition, she
represented a special class of patients whose care should be decided not
by EMTALA, which makes no exceptions for extraordinary
circumstances, but rather by state malpractice law, which is better
equipped to answer such complicated questions.' 2 Judge Sprouse
concluded by opining that the hospital's refusal to stabilize Baby K's
respiratory distress should not have been considered a violation of
EMTALA.20
IV. WHY THE MAmORrrY RULE IS UNWISE
A. Congress and the Courts Should Not Be Making Medical Decisions
In Baby K, the Fourth Circuit's literal reading of EMTALA's
language led to an inarguably absurd result. The court's arguments rest
on its decision to characterize Baby K's respiratory distress, rather than
her anencephaly, as her emergency medical condition. The court
compared anencephaly to coma, lung cancer, and muscular dystrophy, all
conditions which can lead to respiratory distress and to eventual
death.' This comparison is far more valid than the district court's
analogy to people with AIDS or cancer who are injured in an accident and
seek emergency medical care. 5 The cancer or AIDS did not cause the
accidental injury, whereas Baby K's anencephaly did cause her respiratory
distress. Furthermore, when an accident victim receives prompt
emergency care, he generally will recover from his condition. If he never
gets into another accident, he will not need emergency care for that
reason again. Baby K, on the other hand, would undoubtedly experience
repeated episodes of respiratory distress. They were caused by her
anencephaly, from which she was certain to suffer as long as she lived;
resuscitation could not make her anencephaly go away. In forcing the
hospital to resuscitate Baby K, the court did nothing but prolong her
inevitable death.
240. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
241. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
243. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
244. 16 F.3d at 598.
245. 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
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The appellate court's analogy to a person in a coma or plagued with
cancer or muscular dystrophy is more appropriate.' When such a
person experiences respiratory distress, it is caused by her disease or
condition, just as Baby K's respiratory distress was caused by her
anencephaly. Similarly, a cancer patient's respiratory distress may
present an end-of-life decision. Treatment decisions in these situations are
complicated, delicate matters that often depend upon the accepted standard
of care for the particular stage of the illness involved. Under Baby K's
literal interpretation of EMTALA, hospitals are required to resuscitate
every patient who stops breathing on her own, no matter how futile or
inhumane such aggressive treatment may be in some cases. Aggressive
treatment in every case, no matter how advanced the disease, cannot be
the result that Congress intended when it passed the act. Such a result
leaves no room for professional medical judgment and defies the
economic realities of the health care system.' 7 There are only so many
beds available and so many dollars to be spent. For this reason and the
very personal nature of each case, each decision should be made
separately.
When conflicts arise between families and physicians, malpractice law
should decide these cases. Malpractice law is much more refined and
more capable of handling these complicated decisions than EMTALA.
While the result of Baby K under malpractice law would be impossible to
predict with absolute certainty, it is likely that the hospital would have
prevailed. The heart of a malpractice suit is the question of whether the
physician acted in conformity with the common practice within his
profession.' The standard treatment for anencephalics is warmth,
hydration, and nutrition. 9 Because the standard treatment does not
include such aggressive therapies as ventilator support, it is not likely that
the hospital would have been found negligent had it refused to resuscitate
Baby K.
The hospital would also have prevailed if the court had interpreted
EMTALA using either of the two minority rules. Under the indigent-and-
246. 16 F.3d at 598.
247. During a television interview, a spokesman for the American Academy of
Pediatrics said of the Baby K case: "We're spending thousands and thousands of dollars
with no hope of benefiting the patient. The question here is the extent to which an
individual's religious views or other personal beliefs can command important social
resources." Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1994). The reported total
cost of Baby K's medical care as of November 1994 was $247,872, and the cost of her
nursing home care was about $500,000. ld.
248. Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
249. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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uninsured-only rule,' this case would not have been decided by
EMTALA, as Baby K's medical care was paid for by her mother's HMO.
Under the Cleland rule,"1 the hospital would have prevailed because it
did not have an improper motive in wanting to refuse Baby K aggressive
treatment. The hospital did not want to refuse treatment based upon Baby
K's race, for example; it wanted to refuse treatment in order to comport
with standard medical practice and ethical guidelines.
The hospital would also have prevailed if the court had followed the
approach it later used in Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n,'2 when it
adopted the following test:
We believe the best approach, and the standard we now adopt, is
to allow a hospital, after a plaintiff makes a threshold showing of
differential treatment, to offer evidence rebutting that showing
either by demonstrating that the patient was accorded the same
level of treatment that all other patients receive, or that a test or
procedure was not given because the physician did not believe
that the test was reasonable or necessary under the particular
circumstances of that patient. If the hospital offers such rebuttal
evidence, fairness dictates that the plaintiff should be allowed to
challenge the medical judgment of the physicians involved
through her own expert medical testimony.
250. Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992); Coleman v.
McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D. Okla.
1991), overruled by Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992);
ZaiKaner v. Danaher, No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 1990);
Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F.
Supp. 325, 329-30 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495,
497-98 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
251. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990).
252. 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in Power, uninsured and
unemployed, was misdiagnosed and, as a result, lost both legs beneath the knee as well
as the sight in one eye and also suffered permanent lung damage. id. at 855. The court
ruled that the hospital violated EMTALA by inadequately screening Ms. Power. Id. at
859. The hospital argued that the Cleland rule, which requires an improper motive on
the hospital's part, should apply. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272. The court rejected this
argument, explaining that "having to prove the existence of an improper motive . . .
would make a civil EMTALA claim virtually impossible. We do not believe that proving
the inner thoughts and prejudices of attending hospital personnel is required in order to
recover under EMTALA." Power, 42 F.3d at 858. The approach adopted in Power,
which takes legitimate medical judgment into account, was perhaps inspired by the uproar
over the Bay K decision.
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Because this test allows for legitimate medical judgment, the hospital
would certainly have prevailed. Instead, the court's decision to follow the
majority rule led to the absurd result that now stands.
In the case of Baby K, Congress and federal judges used EMTALA
to take medical decision-making out of the hands of physicians by
overriding a legitimate medical and ethical decision, something Congress
surely never intended to do. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit both held that a literal reading of EMTALA required
Fairfax Hospital to provide medical treatment that is considered medically
and ethically inappropriate by the medical profession. According to an
American Academy of Pediatrics attorney, this is the first case in which
the courts have ordered physicians to render medical care under
protest.' 3 This is a very dangerous precedent, and similar results could
be seen again if EMTALA is not amended. Congress could not
reasonably have intended to force physicians to provide treatment under
protest when their treatment decision was motivated by legitimate medical
judgment. Physicians are intensively and specially trained to make
medical decisions; congressional representatives and judges are not.
In Baby K, the district court ruled that EMTALA makes no
exceptions for futile or inhumane treatment. ' The court of appeals
ruled that EMTALA makes no exceptions for care that is outside the
prevailing standard of medical care or that is medically and ethically
inappropriate. 5 Congress could not have intended to force physicians
to provide futile or inhumane treatment, medically and ethically
inappropriate treatment, or treatment that falls outside the prevailing
standard of care. Nor could Congress have intended a precedent that
could force hospitals to provide dying patients with every measure of
aggressive treatment, no matter how dismal their prognoses.
In enacting EMTALA, Congress wanted to prevent dumping,' not
to override legitimate medical decisions. Even if it had wanted to enter
the decision-making arena, it is difficult to believe that it would have
created a tool for the job as vague as EMTALA. In attempting to create
tests to determine when violations have occurred, the courts have been
left to grope in the dark, ultimately ruling on tests with goals
indistinguishable from those of malpractice law. 7  Yet EMTALA is
253. Castaneda, supra note 188, at 3A.
254. 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
255. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 595, 597.
256. H.R. REP. No. 241, supra note 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42,726-
27.
257. See, e.g., Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ill.
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not sophisticated enough to decide what is essentially a malpractice case.
Malpractice law takes into account accepted standards of care and the
characteristics, diagnosis, and prognosis of each patient. Because
EMTALA takes none of these into account, it should not be interpreted
in a way that allows it to override legitimate medical decisions. Congress
enacted EMTALA for the purpose of overriding economic decisions only;
its use should be limited to cases of true dumping.
B. The Dangers of Overlap with Malpractice Law 8
Under the majority rule as it now stands, plaintiffs do not need to
allege that the hospital acted with improper economic motives.'
Under the majority rule, a hospital is liable when it fails to provide a
patient with the same screening it gives everyone else or when it fails to
stabilize an emergency medical condition.' The majority rule also
holds that EMTALA does not guarantee a correct diagnosis and that
EMTALA does not create a federal malpractice law." Despite the
courts' claims, plaintiffs seem to have noticed that the majority rule does
in effect create a federal malpractice law. Plaintiffs understandably want
to increase their chance of collecting damages by bringing suit under as
many theories as possible, and many have done just that. 6 2
The incidence of EMTALA suits might increase as the statute and its
interpretations become more familiar to the plaintiffs' malpractice bar.
One practitioners' journal recently featured an article promoting
EMTALA as a "little-known but valuable separate cause of action" for
plaintiffs in malpractice actions.' The authors declare: "[t]he list of
1990).
258. For a more detailed discussion of this issue alone, see Demetrios G.
Metropoulos, Note, Son of COBRA: The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Law, 45
STAN. L. REv. 263 (1992).
259. See, e.g., Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992);
Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991); Gatewood, 933 F.2d
at 1040; Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1990);
Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1306.
260. See, e.g., Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Collins, 963 F.2d at 308; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1039; Power v.
Arlington Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 n.15 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 42 F.3d 851 (4th
Cir. 1994); Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, Inc., 771 F. Supp.
343, 344 (E.D. Okla. 1991), overruled by Collins, 963 F.2d 303; Deberry, 741 F. Supp.
at 1303; ZaiKaner v. Danaher, No. 4-89-749, 1990 WL 264721, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct.
21, 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325, 326 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v.
University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
263. Mark R. Bower & Charles S. Gucciardo, Proving A Separate Cause ofAction
in Malpractice Cases for Violation of the Federal "Anti-Dumping" Act, VERDICTS,
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things the plaintiff need not prove is more impressive than the short list
of what [the] plaintiff must prove."' They conclude by predicting that
"with growing experience, more and more EMTALA actions will reach
trial" and by advising "all members of the plaintiffs malpractice bar" to
"study the EMTALA cause of action and consider its application to their
pending and future emergency room cases."'
An enormous number of EMTALA suits would be justified if, in fact,
numerous violations are occurring. People have the right to be
compensated for their injuries, and physicians and hospitals who dump the
uninsured should be punished for the sake of both retribution and
deterrence. But the majority interpretation leaves too much room for
abuse. The cost to hospitals of defending themselves against numerous
unnecessary' suits will drive up the cost of running a hospital. As a
result, the price of health care could go up, leaving fewer people who can
actually pay for their care individually or through insurance. More
emergency rooms might close, forcing more of the indigent and uninsured
into the few that remain. The final result could be an increase in
economically motivated dumping, the very tragedy that Congress tried to
prevent by enacting EMTALA.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of courts interpreting EMTALA, along with the
Department of Health and Human Services, have ruled that anyone can
bring a claim under the Act. The majority has been unable to effectively
distinguish an EMTALA violation from a malpractice violation, despite
claims to the contrary. The result in at least one case, Baby K, is
inarguably absurd and offensive to the medical profession.
Furthermore, broad application of EMTALA could end up defeating
the very purpose Congress had in mind when creating it. Increased
litigation for hospitals, automatic provision of aggressive treatment in
every end-of-life decision, and care beyond the normal standard for
religious reasons all add up to increased costs for hospitals. Increased
costs for hospitals translate to increased costs for patients. Increased costs
for patients will result in fewer patients able to pay. With fewer patients
able to pay, hospitals will have more incentive to dump emergency room
patients. The resulting decrease in access to emergency health care
SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, May 1994, at 147.
264. Id. at 148.
265. Id. at 151.
266. I am characterizing EMTALA suits that involve no evidence of true dumping
as "unnecessary."
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services would be the very antithesis of Congress' laudable goal of
ensuring access to such care for those who are unable to pay.
In light of these arguments and the apparent confusion in the federal
court system over the proper construction of EMTALA's application, the
need for Congress to clarify EMTALA's scope is undeniably urgent.
Congress should limit EMTALA's application to cases of true
dumping. 7 If only the indigent and uninsured were allowed to bring
EMTALA claims, much of the current confusion would be resolved.
Patients and families would bring fewer EMTALA claims to trial, and the
overlap with malpractice law would be eliminated. While less desirable,
an alternative solution would be to amend EMTALA to allow for
legitimate medical judgment with a test similar to the one suggested in
Power, in order to prevent another Baby K catastrophe. Under Power,
a hospital may rebut an allegation of dumping by showing that its decision
not to conduct a test of procedure was based on medical, not economic,
reasons.m
Because patient dumping is an extremely dangerous and all too
common practice, EMTALA is undeniably a necessary law. Its necessity
was demonstrated by the Public Citizens' Health Research Group's recent
report stating that eighty-six hospitals in twenty-two states were cited for
violating the Act during 1993 and the first quarter of 1994.1 Dumping
is a contemptible practice that causes real harm to vulnerable people. But
Congress, in its noble attempt to end this practice, did not provide the
courts with adequate directions to really tackle this problem. The time
has come for Congress to correct its mistake.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (1994) might be amended (as shown in italics) to look
something like this:
(d) Enforcement
(2) Civil enforcement
(A) Personal harm
Any individual who was unable to pay for treatment, either
through insurance or out of pocket, and who suffers
personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's
violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil
action against the participating hospital, obtain those
damages available for personal injury under the law of the
State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable
relief as is appropriate.
268. Power, 42 F.3d at 858.
269. Paul Recer, Group Says Hospitals Still "Dump" Patients, Boston Globe, Oct.
27, 1994, at 9A. Interestingly enough, Recer states that these hospitals "were cited by
the government for rejecting patients for nonmedical reasons .... " Id. (emphasis
added).
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